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Introduction
Recent developments in credit markets over the past few months have seen credit

spreads widen dramatically for a range of debt products. Almost overnight, credit spreads
for both investment grade and high yield bonds jumped as news continued to worsen
about credit quality. The speed with which credit spreads increased this past summer led
many investors to ask if markets were efficient in conveying material information, and to
see ifthere were any indications prior to the credit crunch that the market for credit was
going to tighten. New products such as credit derivatives have increased the number of
indicators investors can use to evaluate markets and subsequently increase the efficiency
of these markets. However, credit derivative products are relatively new and have only
recently begun to be traded extensively, thus it is yet to be seen how efficient the market
for credit derivatives is and whether they can be used to anticipate credit events.
The relatively young age of credit derivatives means that there are still many things to
be determined about their nature in the financial markets. Their effects may not be fully
comprehended, but the market has embraced their use, as there are over $62 trillion
dollars worth of notational credit derivatives outstanding today. This is more than half of
the real assets in the world. Credit default swaps may seem to be a great way to diversify
risk away and distribute it across the financial system, but they actually amplify risk. For
example, if Ford issues one billion dollars worth ofbonds and defaults with a recovery
rate of 40%, $600 million dollars will be lost in the cash market. However, ten billion
dollars worth of credit default swaps could be written on Ford and could amount to losses
of over three billion dollars.
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In a recent Wall Street Journal article (April2008), it was estimated that should a
major credit default player fail to meet their obligations, it could result in $36 to $47
billion dollars worth of losses across the financial system. Many of these contracts are
intertwined among numerous market participants and thus have overarching effects
should an event like this occur. The possibility of a large market player failing was
almost realized when Bear Stems was sold in March of2008. JP Morgan assumed all of
Bear's debts and obligations and therefore avoided a wide scale crisis that could have
occurred if Bear Stems had folded. One of the reasons that the Federal Reserve assisted
in the sale of Bear was because it feared a reported $1.4 trillion dollars worth of
derivatives on its books that, should Bear Sterns had failed, would have sent a shockwave
to an already strained financial system. Therefore the study of credit derivatives is crucial
to understanding how financial innovation can effect financial markets.
Much research has been conducted to decide if markets- whether equity or fixed
income, are efficient in conveying information among investors. In the fixed income
realm, most research has centered on whether bond prices and yields accurately reflect
risks associated with the credit rating of corporations or specific bonds. In, " The Price
and Adjustment Process of Bonds to Rating Reclassifications: A Test of Bond Market
Efficiency'' by Katz (1974), the author found that in the price adjustment process of
bonds, there exists no price adjustment or signaling prior to the public announcement of
rating reclassifications. Further, Katz found that there was a slight lag of approximately
six to ten weeks in the adjustment process following the announcement, suggesting gross
inefficiencies in the bond market. When compared with the more efficient equity market,
Katz's research demonstrated that there was little institutional research being done to
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determine the proper credit level of bonds. He determined that the market relied primarily
on rating agencies for that information, thereby creating this inefficiency in the bond
market. Efficiency suffered at the time because there were very few market participants
pursuing profit opportunities.
Since Katz's original study in 1974, bond markets have evolved so that they
demonstrate characteristics of market efficiency much like their equity brethren. This is
observed for a number of reasons including better access to information and the sharing
of that information due to technology. More importantly, the profit opportunity in the
fixed income market has grown exponentially from Katz's original study. It is evident in ·
the explosion in size of the high yield market in the 1980's and the growing use of
leverage and quant strategies by hedge funds in fixed income products. All of this has
contributed to the growing number of participants in the fixed income market and solves
the main issue that Katz identified, that the lack of players created an inefficiency.
Most important to the evolution of efficiency in the bond market, has been the
creation of credit derivative products. Relatively new, these products tie their value to an
underlying bond. One of these new products is Credit Default Swaps (CDS). Credit
Default Swaps act like insurance policies for bond holders. An investor, who holds a
bond, can also buy the CDS for that bond. If a bond issuer triggers any number of events,
such as defaulting on interest payments or breaks a covenant, the seller of the CDS is
obliged to pay par value for the bond to the CDS buyer in return for the underlying. The
premium paid for this protection should reflect all risks associated with the bond and
corporation. Similarly to how a bond's price should incorporate the risk of default, the
premium charged by a credit protection seller should include those risks. Therefore,
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market efficiency should price CDS premiums and bond prices equally as they both
incorporate underlying credit risks into their prices.
If inefficiency were to arise in the ability of one market to lead the other in price
discovery, an arbitrage opportunity would exist. Price discovery is defined by Lehman
(2002) as the efficient and rapid processing of information which passes through trade
into market prices. When trading related instruments in two separate markets, price
discovery is divided into these two markets and the market with the larger contribution to
price discovery is said to lead the other.

2)

Literature Review
Di Cesare (2006) studied the ability of credit default swap spreads, bond spreads,

and stock prices to anticipate the decisions of rating agencies. Di Cesare used a data set
of 42 international banks over the course of four years. He found that CDS spreads were
relatively more efficient than option adjusted spreads (OAS) and stock prices in
anticipating negative rating events. Heinke (2006) conducted research where he tested for
significance in credit spread volatility of plain vanilla Eurobonds over a period of twelve
years. Heinke calculated the spread volatility based on the holding-period approach over
traditional yield to maturity methodology because that approach tends to overestimate
values for downgrades and underestimate test values for upgrades. He found that credit
spread volatility rises around the a~ouncement of rating downgrades and falls around
upgrades, suggesting market anticipation of rating announcements.
Hull, Predescu, and White (2004) conducted research that included 31 named
reference entities for a period of four years. Their research centered on the ability of the
credit default market to anticipate ratings announcements by looking at predetermined
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time intervals surrounding a ratings announcement. They found that there was a
relationship between all three types of negative credit rating announcements and credit
spread levels. They concluded that 42.6% of downgrades, 39% of reviews for
downgrades, and 50.9% of negative outlooks came from the top quartile of credit default
. swap changes. However, Hull et al. and Micu, Remolona, and Wooldridge (2004) found
that there is little statistical significance in market indicators prior to positive rating
announcements.
Heinke (2006) also found that volatility was not only related to credit rating
announcements, but also rose with market uncertainty and fell with liquidity. A recent
report by the Wall Street Journal found for the high yield sector that several Dow Jones
indexes based on derivatives started to sell offbefore an index tracking the cash market
did this summer, indicating that the credit derivative markets foreshadow the cash
market. Further work conducted by FitchRatings Research (2003) over the course of two
years found that in the summer of2002, CDS spreads widened ahead of negative rating
announcements. However, they also widened without any announcements. This suggests
that market indicators may either present false signals or other external factors may
influence volatility besides market anticipation.
In a Bank of International Settlements paper, Zhu (2004) developed a theoretical
model that predicts the parity of bond prices in the cash market versus those in the credit
derivative market. He performed analysis on 24 reference entities over the course of three
years. His analysis shows that pricing of risk in these two markets is equal, on average,
in the long term. However, in the short term, he concludes that prices can vary
significantly due to how each market reacts to changes ~in credit conditions. The credit
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derivatives market prices credit risk quicker than the cash market. In addition, his
research shows significant market segmentation between cash and credit markets between
the United States and Europe because of a more developed derivatives market. This
suggests that derivates are a better tool at pricing credit rating changes and events than
traditional cash markets for bonds. Further research by Blanco, Brennan, and Marsh
(2005) and Di Cesare (2006) demonstrate that CDS lead the pricing of credit risk for
investment grade bonds; that is, they anticipate credit events better than bond prices.
In a recent study, Dotz (2007) looked at 36 European firms of investment grade
quality, using recent data from 2004-2005. He used similar measures of one market's
ability to lead the other in price discovery, but his data was significantly better than past
studies because the availability of accurate and liquid transaction prices was more
prevalent during his study. He found, that out of his sample companies, markets were
split in their ability discovery power. However, Dotz incorporated a time varying factor
into his study that allowed him to track discovery power daily, rather than over a set
period of time. He found that during a period of credit crisis, credit default swaps lose
their pricing power.
Although prior studies have traditionally looked at investment grade bonds and
whether market indicators have anticipated specific changes in ratings by rating agencies,
this paper will test the price discovery power of credit derivatives for both investment
grade and high yield bonds. This study will analyze the pricing of risk between cash and
credit markets for bonds across both the investment grade and the high yield spectrum
and test whether credit default swaps are a better anticipator at predicting credit events
than cash prices. Zhu's theoretical model predicts equality in pricing of risk in the long
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term, but notes the deviation in short term pricing. Thus, by looking for a divergence in
pricing across the credit and cash markets, this paper will be able to test whether one
market enjoys an advantage in its ability to transfer pricing information more efficiently.
The use of accurate data and a recent dataset should create more conclusive results than

previous studies. The conclusion from this analysis will help determine if one product is a
better measure of credit risk than the other, and give investors another tool to predict risk
and potentially profit from.

3)

Theoretical Model
Traditional cash markets for bonds have existed for quite some time. In

the plainest sense, an investor can purchase any type of bond (sovereign, corporate,
municipal) either at a discount or premium to the par price. The price in the cash market
reflects several things including the default and credit risk associated with that particular
bond, percentage yield on coupon payments and term premium among others. This paper
focuses on the risk of the bond and the effect of risk on the price of a bond. If the risk of a
particular bond were to increase, such as in the perceived default of a corporation's debt,
the price for that bond would decrease as pressure from sellers would drive the price
·down.
Recently, credit default swaps have grown in popularity with the innovation of the
credit derivative market. CDS are likened to insurance policies for bonds. An investor
can purchase a CDS from a seller, protecting their investment in a particular bond by
guaranteeing them in a number of default situations. Default events include but are not
limited to: bankruptcy, failure to pay, obligation default or acceleration, repudiation or
moratorium, and rest_ructuring. Thus, CDS incorporate risk into their pricing similar to
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bond prices in the cash market. Therefore, premiums for CDS should be equal to the par
fixed coupon bond in the cash market. An example of a credit default swap is included
below:
Payment only if event occurs
~)\I) \'f'~~~
I
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Premium in basis points of
nominal value
Delivery of
underlying only if
event is triggered

------

Underlying
securities
(ABC Corp.)

In order to determine if CDS predict credit downturns before spreads in the cash

market, existing models from Zhu (2004) and Hull et al. (2004) of CDS and credit
spreads will be utilized. Zhu' s model lays ·the theoretical framework that since there are
no arbitrage conditions between CDS and bond price spreads, CDS premiums should be
equal to the credit spread of a par fixed coupon bond for the same reference entity. That
is to say, there is no profit in buying a risk-less bond, shorting a corporate bond and
selling the CDS. Likewise, there would not be profit in buying a corporate bond, buying
the CDS, and shorting the risk-less bond.

A CDS requires the buyer of protection to pay a premium (p) until the contract
matures, (typically five years), or a credit event occurs. The payment upon a credit event
is defined as the face value minus the market value (Mt,) for cash settlement According
to Zhu, a CDS buyer will pay premium (p) at time tl, t2, ... tn, unless a credit event
occurs. Similarly, a bond holder will receive a coupon payment, (c), at the same
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frequency. Also, define q(t) as the risk neutral default probability for the underlying asset
at time, t, and Q(t) as the risk neutral survival probability until time t.. The premium for
CDS should satisfy the following equation according to Zhu.

N

N

i=l

0

L e -rti Q(ti) p= Je -rt (1 00-Mt)q(t)dt

(1)

Here, r is the constant risk-free rate. The equation above represents a CDS. The left side
of the equation is the present valu·e of the premium a buyer would pay in a risk neutral
world. The right side is the present value of payment a buyer of protection would receive
should a credit event occur.

Zhu uses the same risk neutral assumption in evaluating the current price of the
defaultable bond in the cash market. It can be derived as follows:

N

N

P=lOO=:Le-rtiQ(ti)c+er1n* lOOQ(t,J+=
~

Je -rtM q(t)dt

(2)

1

0

In order to evaluate the no arbitrage theory, assume an investor shorts the
defaultable bond and purchases a par fixed rate risk-less bond, with a coupon rate of r.
According to Zhu's model, since the risk free rate is constant, the risk free bond can
always be sold at par whenever the risky bond defaults. Thus the no arbitrage theory
requires:

N

0=- :Le-r\Q(ti)c-er1n100*Q(tl{)i=l

100 * Q(t,J

J

N

0

i=l

N

e -rtM1 q(t)dt+ :Le-rtir*Q(tJ+

J

N

e -rt*lOO*q(t)dt + ertn *

0

Polselli
N

=> =- Ie·rtiQ(tJ(c-r)=
i=l

10
N

Je ·rt(IOO-Mt)q(t)dt

(3)

0

The above equation on the right side highlights the value of the cash flows from
shorting the risky bond and the last three items represent the value of cash flows from
purchasing the par risk-free bond (Zhu 2004).When comparing this equation with the
pricing formula of credit default swaps in (1 ), the following condition holds: p=c-r. Thus,
CDS spreads should be equal to the credit spreads of the underlying security it is
providing protection to. If this equation does not hold true, arbitrage opportunity would
arise.

The above theoretical model is important because it provides the rationale that
CDS and credit spreads in two different markets (cash and derivative) should be equal. If
this model does not hold true, an arbitrage opportunity would arise and an investor could
seize the opportunity to profit off of the price disparity. Further, a divergence from the
equality of the two spreads reveals whether one, both, or neither of the pricing spreads
offers insight into predicting credit events. The model holds in the equality of these two
prices. A divergence of one from the other, preceding a credit event, may signify whether
one market and/or price spread is more efficient at reacting to or predicting market
information, or evaluating risk. To illustrate how a market participant could take
advantage of a pricing discrepancy, the following table is included where y= the yield on
the bond, r= the risk free rate and s = the CDS spread.
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At TimeT
Ifs>y-r

CDS Premium greater

Short Underling

+$100

Buy Treasury

-$100

Sell CDS on same underlying

--(no cash outflow at sale)

At timeT+ 1
Collect Treasury proceeds

+$110

Pay off CDS (assuming credit event)

- $1 00 (Receive underlying bond)

Replace underlying in short transaction

--(use bonds received from CDS transaction)
Net= $10

If a market participant observed that the price of a CDS was indicating a higher
probability of default than the cash market for the same underlying bond, a market
participant could take advantage of this arbitrage opportunity. At time T, they could short
the underlying security resulting in a cash inflow. Using the same proceeds, they could
invest them in a risk free treasury security, and write protection on the same underlying
name. At time T + 1, the treasury security would mature and it is assumed that at this
point, a credit event occurred that triggered the credit default swap. The investor would
redeem the treasury security, receiving the principal plus interest. In order to settle the
CDS obligation, the investor would pay the counterparty par value using the treasury
proceeds and receive the underlying bonds in return. They would then use the bonds
received to replace the short transaction that was initiated at time T. The investor would
then be left with the interest proceeds from the treasury security.
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The presence of an arbitrage opportunity should force market powers to keep the
two markets in equilibrium. If arbitrage were available, market participants would
quickly seek them out and force prices to level off until the opportunity disappeared.
Therefore, the equation that the CDS spread is equal to the yield on an underlying bond
minus the risk free rate should hold true; but if it doesn't, the disequilibrium may signify
how one market leads in price discovery power.

This model does present some limitations to the reality in which both of these
markets exist. Although Zhu's theoretical model is correct in theory, external factors
could affect the implementation of this transaction or adversely affect the accurate pricing
of CDS. For example, there are two types of settlement options available to the writer of
CDS, physical and cash settlement. Cash settlement would simply net the difference
between par and market value of the underlying bonds. Physical settlement could be met
by delivery of the actual bonds or any security with the necessary seniority in a major
currency. This subsequently results in a "cheapest to deliver" option and contributes to
CDS spreads being wider than bond spreads to offset the risk of receiving a less valuable
bond.

When trading CDS, there is considerable counterparty risk, in addition to the
underlying credit risk, that must be accounted for. Currently, there is no organized
exchange or clearinghouse that guarantees trades. Therefore, each side to a credit default
swap incurs counterparty risk into their transaction; the buyer bears a greater risk than the
seller because if the seller does not follow through with their obligation, the buyer is out
the par value of his bonds, whereas the seller can only lose the quarterly premium. This
results in asymmetry of information and contributes to narrow CDS spreads.
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Data
In order to find data that would be germane to the question, a relevant set of

underlying companies was needed that had both actively traded bonds and credit
derivatives. In order to satisfy this requirement, the Markit CDX index for high yield and
investment grade names was chosen as a reference for possible companies. Markit is an
independent company for credit derivative pricing that creates indices of credit
derivatives such as credit default swaps. Both the high yield and investment grade index
for credit derivatives were used as references for underlying companies to test because
these names represent the most liquid and actively traded bonds and credit default swaps.
Liquidity is a key component of the study of credit default swaps because past
research has faced constraints in the form of the availability of transaction data for CDS
prices. Choosing liquid names helped ensure that transaction data would be available and
that an accurate study could be completed. There are several different maturity lengths
for credit default swaps ranging from one to ten years, but five year CDS are the most
liquid instruments and thus all CDS data in this study are based off of that maturity.
Once reference names were selected, bonds needed to meet certain criteria. First,
they needed to be·option free. The presence of options could affect the price of a bond in
a negative manner and not capture the same risk associated with the credit default swap.
Thus, any bond with embedded options was removed. Second, the bonds selected must be
the most senior issued. Again, if a junior or subordinated bond was chosen, the price
could be negatively affected because of the incorporation of additional risk into its price.
Finally, because five years was chosen for the maturity length for CDS, it was
necessary that bonds with a five year maturity were chosen to capture the same term

Polselli

14

structure of the CDS. Bonds with maturities of 4.5 to 5.5 years left till maturity were
therefore selected. This does present the possibility that some of the bonds may not be as
liquid because they could be towards the end of their maturity and are not traded as
much. Some researchers have used linear interpolation to create a synthetic five year
bond by using both a short and long dated bond of that reference name; however, this
method was not incorporated in this study.
After defining the above selection criteria, 80 companies, (49 investment grade
and 31 high yield names) were selected. The transaction data was downloaded from
Thompson Datastream that has an extensive financial database based on trades from
market makers. Both sets of data are daily quotes settled at the end of the trading day.
There are 348 observations spanning a time span from November 1, 2006 to February 29,
2008. This time period does include the volatile period that began in the summer of2007.
The quotes for credit default swaps are represented by the mid point of the bid-ask
spread. The increase of liquidity shrank the spread between the bid-ask prices for CDS
making the mid point measure a good indicator of price. For bonds, a credit spread was
calculated based on the difference between the yield on the bond chosen and the swap
rate. The swap rate is chosen as the risk free rate over other benchmark yields because
swaps are very liquid while other.._.benchmark curves can be distorted by market
operations, such as repo transactions.

Polselli.
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Econometric methods
In order to determine whether one of two markets for the same underlying

reference leads the other in price discovery, the long-term consistency and short-term
dynamic connections of both markets need to be analyzed. The credit and cash markets
constitute time series· and thus demand special consideration when running econometric
tests. One of the main problems when dealing with econometric time series is that they
are often non-stationary.
If a time series is non-stationary, its behavior can only be studied during that one

particular instance for which data is available. It would not be possible to use the
conclusions made from that data set to draw generalities about that markets. Therefore, in
order for time series to be relevant in this research, it must be covariance stationary. Its
mean and variance must be constant over time and the value of the covariance between
the two time periods must depend only on the distance or lag between the two time
periods and not the actual time at which the covariance is computed. To solve this
problem, non-stationary time series can become stational")' by taking the first order
difference of the time series. This process enables the results to be interpreted and applied
to these markets in general, outside of this time period alone.
In addition to the stationary problem, it needs to be determined if both time-series

are cointegrated, meaning they have a long-term or equilibrium relationship. It would not
be surprising to find that both of these markets price credit risk the same in the long-run
considering that market forces would eventually push prices to market equilibrium in the
long-term
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It is important to note that for purposes of this study, it was assumed that the data

included for each reference name were non-stationary and cointegrated. Past research
tested the data to see if it was stationary and cointegrated and in all the cases, it was.
Based on these results and consistency, these tests were not performed in this study, but
measures were taken to correct for them, assuming they were present.
The next step in the process is to determine the short-term dynamic connections
between the two time series. Using the assumption that these time series are cointegrated
in the long run, the disequilibrium between the two time series must lie in the short term
and provide insight on what market is more efficient in reflecting changes in the credit
risk of the underlying securities. An error correction model (ECM) can correct for
disequilibrium based on the Granger Representation Theorem, that states if two variables,
Y and X are cointegrated; the relationship between the two can be expressed as an ECM.

6)

The Vector Error Corr'ection Model (VECM)
Using the Granger Representation Theorem, a VECM model can be incorporated

in order to tie the short term behavior with the long-run through the error term, by
correcting for the disequilibrium. This process will provide for a direct answer to the
causality relationship. Therefore, the following model adapted from Hull et al. (2004),
was used in testing the relationship between the two markets:
p

. !J..pcds, t = A1(pcch,t -1- a 0- a1pcs,t -1) +. L~=1+ p!j!J..pcs,t- j +L alj!J..pcs,t- j + &1t
~~

p

!J..pcs,t = A2(pcch,t -1- ao- a1pcs,t -1) + L~=1+ /32J!J..pcch,t- 1 +L G'2j!J..pcs,t- j + &2t
j~l

In this equation, cds1 and cs1 represent CDS spreads and bond spreads respectively
at period t.

!J..pcds and !J..pcs represent the difference of the CDS and bond spread
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respectively and the two terms, while £1 and £2 are independent, identically distributed
shocks. The two lambdas in the equation,

At

and A2 are the estimated coefficients that

are to be determined. These will indicate how quickly CDS and/or credit spreads for
bonds re-converge to the long-run relationship after a shock or deviation in the market.
\

This model solves several of the problems identified earlier when dealing with
time series data. The two equations in the model are in first-order difference and
therefore solve the problem that non-stationary data create. In addition, the model also
includes a lagged basis spread term, where. a o= 0 and

at=

1, that provides for an added

explanatory variable to explain changes in credit spreads. Without this term in the
equation, the cointegrated system estimated would be over differenced.
Finally the p term in the model represents the number oflags that were included
in the short term equation of the full model. The selection of lags was determined using
the Ak:aike (AIC) criteria by including many lags at first, and running regressions on six
different entities as a sample. The initial test included all of the lags at once to determine
which lag length had the lowest AIC criteria. It was determined that eight lags was the
appropriate length, and thus data from eight trading days before time T were used in the
model for all names.
Once the appropriate lag length was found, regressions were run for all 80 of the
underlying companies._ As described earlier,

At· and A2

were the estimated coefficients

used to determine how fast CDS or bond spreads would reconverge. In this study, a
significant and positive· At (negative A2) would indicate that the CDS market moves to
correct price discrepancies ahead of the bond market.
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In addition to the information the lambdas provide, an additional measurement
variable was included called the Gonzalo-Granger (GG) measure. This reflects the
contribution of each market to price discovery. It can be defined as the ratio of the speed
adjustment in the two markets, given by the equation:
AI
(A1-A2)
The upper and lower bounds of this equation are 0 and 1. A. measurement greater
GG=

than 0.5 indicates that the CDS market leads in price discovery of the underlying
reference, with increasing pricing power as the measurement moves towards 1. A
measure less than 0.5 indicate that the pricing power lies within the cash or bond market
for the reference entity. When the measure is 0.5, this indicates that both markets
contribute to the price of the bond equally and one market has no clear advantage than the
other.
7)

Results
The results are included in the appendix of this paper and include the significance

levels for each lambda and the Gonzalo-Granger measurement for each company. To
summarize, there were 49 investment grade companies used in this study. For all but five
of them, the credit default market led in terms of price discovery. The average GG
measures 0.677, indicating the credit derivative market's advantage in pricing power. In ·
the high-yield market, all but five ofthe 31 companies studied indicate that the bond
market had pricing power over the credit derivative market. The average GG measure for
all of the high yield companies was 0.25, a strong indicator that the cash market leads
price discovery for high yield names.
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These results indicate that credit default swaps are more efficient atprice
discovery in the investment grade market and that the bond market retains this power
with high yield companies. Prior studies have not tested high yield names for price
discovery and thus there is no past research to compare to, but the results are not
surprising. The ability for credit default swaps to lead in price discovery relies on the
fact that there is an active and liquid market for credit derivatives to have price
efficiency. This may not be true for high yield companies as their probability of default
increases. Market participants inay not want to write credit default protection for
companies with a high certainty of default, or may simply price it so high that it would
not realistically be purchased.
Further, market participants in CDS not only trade the underlying credit risk of
the named company, but also trade counterparty risk as described earlier. Currently, there
are no organized exchanges for CDS. They are traded over the counter and largely rely on
the reputation of parties involved. A recent Wall Street Journal article published in April
2008 highlights the potential creation of a clearinghouse for CDS in the second half of
2008. The creation of a clearinghouse that would guarantee trades would remove some of
the uncertainty that is associated with counterparty risk and could potentially increase the
liquidity for the high-yield market as some of the risk factors were removed. The increase
of liquidity could lead to the increased ability of CDS to lead in price discovery for the

high yield segment.
Another factor that can influence the discovery power of a market is the size of
bond issuance and/or the distribution of that issuance throughout the market. Credit
default swaps can be used by hedgers and speculators, and thus can write as many
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contracts as they can find counterparties to. On the other hand, bonds are restricted by the
issuance size and can be influenced depending on if one buyer holds a large proportion of
that debt. For example, there may be 100 million dollars worth of CDS written on a
company, but there might only be a 10 million doliar bond issuance. This may limit the
cash market's ability to serve as an indicator of price efficiency because there is a small
notational amount outstanding, and/or one investor could have a significant holding.
Investors may also hold bonds until maturity, which can affect the information processing
component of the market. On the other hand, the nature of CDS allows large amounts of
protection to be written and traded, allowing for CDS to reflect default risk more quickly.
This could explain in some instances why the CDS market is a better indicator than the
cash market.
Credit default swaps are not perfect though. Currently, there are five or six main
players in the credit derivatives market. Thus, these products are highly concentrated and
may contribute to inaccurate. pricing of CDS because of this concentration. This can put a
large strain on liquidity, especially during times of crisis as discovered by Dotz (2007).
Until this summer, investment banks were the only ones who could truly
diversify the risk created by selling CDS and provide a liquid market for CDS that others
could not. For example, when collateralized debt obligations (CDO) were popular,
investment banks could create a synthetic CDO out of credit default swaps they had
Written. They were able to write protection on companies but securitize these obligations
and sell them, removing the liability off of their books. This process had a negative
impact on CDS premiums. But as the subprime crisis runs course, the absence of the
ability to issue CDO may put more positive pressure on CDS prices than before. These
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net affects have not fully been incorporated into this study because of the timing of the
data set used, but it must be considered that the potential for pricing power could alter
significantly in subsequent years.

8) Conclusion
This paper built upon past studies examining the price discovery power of the bond
and credit derivative markets for bonds. Incorporating techniques developed earlier, this
study attempted to discover which market was more efficient at transferring information
to market participants for both investment and high yield companies. In addition, it used a
recent data set (November 1, 2006, to February 29, 2008) of domestic bonds. The results
of the analysis show that for investment grade companies, the credit derivative market is
more efficient in incorporating risk into the market in all but five companies. For hi~
yield companies, the reverse is true and the cash market is more efficient in all but five
cases as well. The results are not that unexpected considering that the investment grade
. market for credit default swaps may be more liquid as far as trading and number of
contracts outstanding relative to the high yield market.
In a final note, this study incorporated data from the turbulent summer of 2007
that sent both credit and CDS spreads into uncharted territory as the market suddenly repriced all aspects of credit from ultra safe to junk bonds. Although the data set was
chosen to include a substantial time span of a relatively normal market environment
beforehand, the full effect of the credit crisis of2007 on this study is not fully known.
Research based on the credit crisis of 2005 by Dotz suggests that CDS would lose its
price discovery power in times of crisis, but things may have changed significantly since
then. For one, the liquidity of the CDS market has greatly increased since then and the
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credit derivative market domestically was already more developed then that of its
European counterpart. Nonetheless, potential for further study would include converting
the existing VECM into a state space form and estimate it with time varying factors using
a Kalman filter. This would enable us to track the price discovery power of each market
over a daily measurement, to see what exactly happened to the discovery power this past
summer in the credit derivative markets, and see how CDS hold up in the face of a
market wide credit crisis.
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